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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
lawful under Section 8, between corporations in nonregulated industries,
the initial task of ascertaining the competition reducing potential of the
schemes should be delegated to the FTC.66
Competition and predatory practices cannot long coexist. Effective
control of the problem posed by interlocking directorates awaits Con-
gressional action.
INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE IN NONJURY TRIALS:
OUGHT WE PRESUME THAT IT HAS NO EFFECT?
During the course of a jury trial the judge is charged with the
duties of ruling on the admissibility of evidence offered by the parties1
ing well, are used more as a label than a description of what is actually pertinent to the
prohibition desired. See note 31 supra.
66. At present, inspection of existing interlocking is in the main superficial. For
example, the conclusions of the FTC's report on interlocking directorates speaks in terms
of possible use or potential results. See note 13 supra. These arrangements could be
more critically evaluated by wiser utilization of the broad investigatory powers granted
in Section 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46
(1946).
1. Disquisition with regard to the law of evidence has generally concerned its rela-
tion to litigation in the trial stage. See, e.g., A Symposium On Evidence, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 275 (1952); HARv. L. REV., SEEcrnn ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (4th
ed. 1949). At that level it is subject to greater notice due to its determinative effect
upon what may be introduced. A case cannot be prepared or presented by an attorney
until he has ascertained whether the evidence available is competent in the eyes of the
law. Relevant and persuasive as facts may be, unless they meet the requirements of the
law of evidence which have been established by centuries of legal proceedings, they are
of no use in a court of law. "The term 'Evidence' imports the means by which any
alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or
disproved. It embraces the rules of law governing the admissibility or rejection of prof-
fered proof and the weight to be given to proof that is admitted." Phillips, A Symposium
On Evidence, Forward, 5 VAND. L. REv. 275 (1952). See also 1 WIGM R, EvDmENcE
§1 (3d ed. 1940).
These requirements permit only evidence which is thought most likely to be relied
upon by "men of serious affairs" to be heard. See Tyne Co. v. NLRB, 125 F.2d 832,
835 (7th Cir. 1942). Through strict and rigid application they purport to keep from the
jury that which is considered most likely to confuse and least likely to be true. See I
WIGM oRE, EVIDENCE: § 4b (3d ed. 1940) ; THAYER, EVIDENCE 509 (1898). "The domi-
nant influence of the jury upon the content of many of the traditional rules is abundantly
clear. Basic in many rules is the idea that untrained jurors should not be exposed to
the relevant but possibly misleading evidence." Davis, An Approach To Problems Of
Evidence In The Administrative Process, 55 HAuv. L. REv. 364, 371 (1942); Davis,
Ezidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads The Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581,
584 n.17 and accompanying text (1950) ; Stone, The Decline of Tury Trial and The Law
of Evidence, 3 REs JUDICATAE 144 (1947). But see Morgan, The Jury And The Excic-
sionary Rules Of Evidence, 4 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 247 (1937); Morgan, Some Observa-
tions Concerning A Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 145, 147 (1940).
The jury, when it has heard all of the competent evidence, arrives at a verdict, and
an appellate court, after being convinced that the evidentiary rules have been followed
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and of making preliminary findings of fact necessary to make those
rulings.2 In a nonjury trial he assumes the added burden of finding
the ultimate facts. The trend toward nonjury litigation raises the issue
of the function of the rules of evidence in this novel context.3
In most of these actions the rules of evidence are probably fol-
lowed as closely as in jury trials, due perhaps to the fact that the
or at least that any violation of them was not prejudicial to the losing party, will not
reverse its verdict unless an examination of the record indicates that it is clearly erro-
neous. See Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 1951); ". . . [E] ffect
must be given to the rule that issues depending upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence are to be decided by the jury." Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner,
102 F.2d 373, 377 (8th Cir. 1939) ; Tanzi v. New York Cent. Ry. Co., 155 Ohio St. 149,
153, 98 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1951); McGhee v. State, 183 Tenn. 20, 23, 189 S.W.2d 826, 827
(1945) ; Burgess v. Gilchrist, 123 W. Va. 727, 738, 17 S.E.2d 804, 810 (1941) ; FED. R.
Civ. p. 52.
Since incompetent evidence that comes in unnoticed by the judge can be removed from
the jury's consideration by a proper instruction where it is not "so deep, pervasive and
enduring" that it cannot be effaced at the judge's direction, the losing party is not able
to gain a reversal on technical grounds. "'The admission of incompetent evidence is no
ground for a new trial if before the case is given to the jury they are instructed to dis-
regard it, and if there is no reason to apprehend that it finally did prejudice their
minds.'" Stricker v. Scott, 283 Mass. 12, 14, 186 N.E. 45, 46 (1932). "The general
rule is that the admission of incompetent evidence is not reversible error if it subse-
quently is distinctly withdrawn from the consideration of the jury." Turner v. Ameri-
can Security & Trust Co., 213 U.S. 257, 267 (1909). See Throckmorton v. Holt, 180
U.S. 552, 567 (1901); Rogers v. State, 60 Ark. 76, 88-89, 29 S.W. 894, 898 (1894);
People v. Cheney, 368 Ill. 131, 136, 13 N.E.2d 171, 174 (1938) (Even though the jury
was told verbally to disregard certain evidence, the accused was entitled to a written
instruction.). LaFontaine v. Wilson, 185 Md. 673, 684-685, 45 A.2d 729, 734 (1946);
State v. Lanegan, 192 Ore. 691, 697, 236 P.2d 438, 441 (1951) ; Harwell v. Mutual Ben.
Health & Acc. Ass'n, 207 S.C. 150, 164, 35 S.E.2d 160, 165-166 (1945); Birch v. Aber-
crombie, 74 Wash. 486, 497, 133 Pac. 1020, 1024 (1913) (where evidence was too preju-
dicial for an instruction to cure the error). One writer has summed the matter up by
saying that ". . . the instruction which will accompany the subsequent striking out of the
evidence must be supposed to be obeyed by the jurors; except in extreme cases which
obviously call for stricter treatment." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENc E § 19 (3d ed. 1940).
The general explanation for confidence in the jury's findings is that it has had the
opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to consider only that pre-
scribed by the law as proper; therefore, a jury and not an appellate court is best fitted
to .find the facts. See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Harvey, 148 F.2d 780, 783 (10th Cir.
1945). "The weight and sufficiency of evidence, the construction to be put upon it, and
the inferences to be drawn therefrom, were matters for the trier of the facts." Dillard
v. McKnight, 34 Cal.2d 265, -, 209 P.2d 387, 396-397 (1949). See also Moore v. Com-
monwealth, 301 Ky. 851, 854, 193 S.W.2d 448, 449 (1946) ; Smith v; Butt & Hardin, 281
Ky. 127, 133, 135 S.W.2d 67, 70 (1940) ; Long v. Forbes, 58 Wyo. 533, 543-544, 136 P.2d
242, 244-245 (1943).
2. "It follows that, so far as the admissibility in law depends on some incidental
question of fact-the absence of a deponent from the jurisdiction, the use of threats to
obtain a confession, the sanity of a witness, and the like-this also is for the judge to
determine, before he admits the evidence to the jury." 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2550
(3d ed. 1940). For application of this rule, see People v. Stewart, 91 Cal. App.2d 675,
205 P.2d 412 (1949) ; Brock v. State, 206 Ga. 397, 400, 57 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1950) ; People
v. Feldman, 299 N.Y. 153, 169, 85 N.E.2d 913, 921 (1949).
3. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 447 et seq. (1951) ; Davis, Evidence Reform: The
Administrative Process Leads The Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581 n.2 (1950).
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attorneys have become so accustomed to following them that any de-
viation seems almost inconceivable. 4 However, if evidence inadmissable
before a jury is admitted over the objection of opposing counsel, an
appellate court will presume that the trial judge, familiar with the per-
tinent rules, disregarded all of the incompetent evidence and based
his findings solely upon that which was competent.5 So long as there
is sufficient competent evidence present in the record to sustain the
judgment or unless it can be affirmatively shown that incompetent
evidence induced the court to make significant findings which would
not otherwise have been made, the decision will not be reversed. This
presumption, when combined with the prevailing premise that a judge
may commit reversible error by excluding over objection evidence which
should have been admitted, lays the foundation for litigation before
a trial judge with almost no necessity for compliance with the rules
of evidence. Too much time, it is argued, can be lost in determining
admissibility, and with the present over crowded dockets every proper
method of conserving time must be utilized. In addition, since the court
is capable of ruling accurately upon admissibility in a jury trial, it is
equally capable of applying the law correctly after all testimony has
been received. 6 Furthermore, findings must be based only on evidence
which the law regards as competent, material, and convincing. Thus,
a party will not be injured by testimony which is considered unreliable
because in reality it has not been used in arriving at the decision. 7 Just
4. "Generally, the exclusionary rules of evidence are applicable in judicial nonjury
situations." Note, 46 ILL. L. Rav. 915, 921 (1952).
5. "In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to
commit reversible error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not.
An appellate court will not reverse . ..unless all of the competent evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the judgment. . . ." Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950). See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 767
(1928) ; Buder v. Becker, 185 F.2d 311, 313-314 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Department of Water
& Power v. Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 181 F.2d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 1950); Grandin
Grain & Seed Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1948) ; McComb v. Nic-
Cormack, 159 F.2d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Doering v. Beuchler, 146 F.2d 784, 786
(8th Cir. 1945) ; Thompson v. Carley, 140 F.2d 656, 660 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Thatenhorst
v. United States, 119 F.2d 567, 571 (10th Cir. 1941) ; Hatch v. Calkins, 21 Cal. App.2d
364, -, 122 P.2d 126, 129 (1942); Keil v. Wilson, 47 N.M. 43, 45, 133 P.2d 705, 706
(1942) ; Woodruff v. Brady, 181 Okla. 105, 108, 72 P.2d 709, 712 (1937) ; Holendyke v.
Newton, 50 Wis. 635, 637, 7 N.W. 558, 559 (1880).
6.. "One who is capable of ruling accurately upon the admissibility of evidence is
equally capable of sifting it accurately after it has been received .. " Builder's Steel
Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, supra note 5, at 379, citing Donnelly Garment Co.
v. NLRB, 123 F.2d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 1941).
7. ". . . [H]e [the party objecting to incompetent evidence] cannot be injured by
the presence in the record of testimony which he [the judge] does not consider compe-
tent or material." Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, supra note 5, at
379.
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as in the case of a jury, the court is in the best position to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses who testify before it.8
A first look at this nonjury procedure could lead to the belief that
here the rules of evidence have no applicability and serve no useful
purpose. More careful scrutiny of the appellate court's language in-
dicates, however, that they continue, though almost unnoticed, to play
an important role, at least theoretically.9 It is not easy to comprehend
exactly how a judge's findings could be attacked as based on incompetent
evidence. Since he is not required to state upon what evidence he has
relied nor to make any evidentiary rulings, the possibility of rebutting
this presumption, although it is perhaps technically present would seem
visionary unless some means is devised to educe the inner workings of
judicial minds. However, even though an attorney is not convinced
that a judge will remain uninfluenced by incompetent evidence, he must
8. See Boston Insurance Co. v. Reed, 166 F.2d 551, 553 (10th Cir. 1948). "He
[the trial judge] sees and hears much we cannot see and hear. We well know there are
things of pith that cannot be preserved in, or shown by the written pages of a bill of
exceptions. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a
printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible
only to the minds eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneer-
ing tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant
or full realization, of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. The brazen face
of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching over-
eagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone
seen by him. In short, one witness may give testimony that reads in print, here, as if
falling from the lips of an angel of light, and yet not a soul who heard it, nisi, believed
a word of it; and another witness may testify so that it reads brokenly and obscurely
in print, and yet there was that about the witness, that carried conviction of truth to
every soul who heard him testify." Yutterberg v. Sternberg, 86 F.2d 321, 324 (8th Cir.
1936), citing Creamer v. Bivet, 214 Mo. 473, 479, 113 S.W.'1118, 1120 (1909). See also
White v. Julia K. Brennan's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 776, 783, 212 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1948) ; City
of Boston v. Boston Port Development Co., 308 Mass. 72, 75, 30 N.E.2d 896, 898 (1941);
McGuinn v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 449, 456, 8 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1940).
"The practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civil Procedure was that the
findings when dependent upon oral testimony where the candor and credibility of the
witnesses would be best judged [by the lower court], had great weight with the appel-
late court. The findings were never conclusive, however. A finding is 'clearly erroneous'
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that mistake has been committed." United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). "It was intended [by
Rule 52], in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, to make applicable the then
prevailing equity practice." Id. at 394. See Fmn. R. Civ. P. 52 and note 1 spram
9. "Nothing is clearer than that a trial judge in any jurisdiction will be reversed
for lack of enough material and competent evidence to support his finding, no matter
how much inadmissible evidence there was in his favor. . . . Thus the presumption-
indulging courts swing into line with the bulk of authority in holding the trial judge
bound, albeit somewhat less finically, by the rules of evidence." Maguire and Epstein,
Rules of Evidence In Preliiary Controversies As to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101,
1116-1117 (1927). Since the publication of this article it has become clear that the
majority requires no compliance with the rules of evidence in a nonjury trial. The
effect of the rules on appeal remains the same, however. See note 5 supra.
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introduce enough that is competent to substantiate on appeal any mate-
rial finding that might be made in his client's favor. Only one method
exists by which a trial attorney or appellate judge may ascertain the
competency of evidence and that is by applying the pertinent rules.
It is difficult to undestand, at first blush, why clearly incompetent
evidence is introduced-unless, of course, experienced, attorneys have
found that it does have some persuasive value. Advocates of this prac-
tice maintain that ignoring exclusionary rules at the trial permits the
judge to allow incompetent but relevant facts to be introduced. How-
ever, it would seem to be one thing to argue for a liberalized set of
rules that would permit the admission of certain evidence which is now
excluded, though deemed to be of value,10 and something different to
support a position condoning the introduction of such evidence yet
preventing the judge from relying on it." The benefit arising from
admission of incompetent evidence is not clear since technically the
judge must reach the same decision as he would were the relevant but
legally inadmissible evidence excluded. Apparently the most important
reason for using this presumption is the time saving that results due
to the omission of arguments concerning evidentiary rules.1 2  This
saving should not, however, be the sole determinative factor.
When a reviewing court refuses to reverse findings of fact it
usually places great emphasis upon the opportunity which the court or
the jury had to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 1 3 In fact, Rule
52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires
that this not be overlooked. 14 And, indeed, the vantage point at the
trial presents the basis, of a cogent argument for giving considerable
weight to their findings. However, the importance attributed to the
lower court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses seems
to be at least partially overlooked when the presumption that a judge
has considered only competent evidence is employed. By requiring a
10. E.g., Cleary, Evidence As A Problem In Communicating, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277
(1952); Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads The Way, 34
MINN. L. REV. 581 (1950); Falkner, The American Law Institutes Model Code of
Evidenwe, 18 WAsH. L. REv. 228 (1943) ; Goodrich, Spotlight On Evidence, 27 J. Ali.
JuD. Soc'Y 113 (1943); Ladd, Modern Thinking Upon Evidence-A Model Code, 17
TENN. L. REV. 10 (1941); McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of The American
Law Institute, 20 TEx. L. REv. 661 (1942); McCormick, Tomorrow's Law Of Evidence,
24 A.B.A.J. 507 (1938); Rubin, Evidence, 1947 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AmmucAN LA-,w
1068; Note, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 238 (1948).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. See Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th
Cir. 1950) ; see note 5 supra.
13. See notes 1 and 8 supra. For a criticism of this practice, see Sunderland, The
Scope of Judicial Review, 27 MICH. L. REV. 416 (1928).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 52. See note 5 supra.
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court to comply with the law of evidence an appellate tribunal can
determine definitely that the plaintiff has introduced only competent
evidence; therefore, if the findings are in his favor, the credibility of
his witnesses is apparent. By use of a presumption, however, an appel-
late court searching a record for competent evidence could sustain a
trial judge by pointing to testimony which was not brought in by
witnesses whom the lower court thought credible.
Thus, reliance on the presumption forces the court, perhaps un-
intentionally, to violate a policy which has long been accepted as
sound by the common law.15 Because of the merit of the reasons
for using the credibility rule the validity of the presumption may be
challenged on this ground. Where two existing legal policies are so
incompatible one must give way, here a presumption which may only
be serving to compound confusion.
It may be that lawyers who take advantage of this opportunity
to introduce incompetent evidence have found that Professors Maguire
and Epstein were correct when they wrote that "nature does not furnish
a jurist's brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the convenience
of legal theory, and convincing evidence does leave its mark."'16 When,
over objection and after argument, he permits evidence to come in,
"it requires an appellate Pollyanna with fingers crossed and tongue in
cheek to presume that the trial judge discovered and removed his error
before judgment."' 1  One court has stated definitely that it is con-
vinced that a judge does not have such control over his mental faculties
that he can with complete confidence say whether inadmissible evidence
he has heard will affect his mind in making a decision.18 As the pre-
sumption is now stated the judge is not even compelled to allow argu-
ment regarding admissibility nor specifically rule on such matters; he
is presumed to have dealt with this while making his findings of fact.',
Certainly the cases that set forth this presumption do not seem to
justify adequately its use. Indeed, an analogy is made to support it
that cannot withstand careful scrutiny. Its advocates point to the fact
that the judge would have to apply the law of evidence in a jury trial
15. See note 1 supra.
16. Maguire and Epstein, supra note 9, at 1115.
17. Id. at 1116.
18. See Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 232, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (1943). Another
court speaking in the same terms pointed out: "It is hard to be sure of one's self after
the evidence is introduced, even if one tries to disregard it." Newman v. Newman, 211
Mass. 508, 510, 98 N.E. 507, 508 (1912).
19. ". . . [M]ore time is ordinarily lost in listening to arguments as to the admissi-
bility of evidence and in considering offers of proof than would be consumed in taking
the evidence proffered. . . ." Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d
377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950).
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and conclude that if he is capable of doing that, he can also apply it
later when he is going through the record.20 In all of their reasoning,
however, no effort is made to set out the obvious distinction between
the two situations. In one, the judge applies supposedly familiar rules
to an offer to prove, giving the proponent of the evidence no chance
to introduce it and, therefore, providing no opportunity for it to in-
fluence either himself or the jury,21 while in the latter case he hears
the evidence, never says whether he deems it to be competent, and then
hands down a decision which is presumed to be based on competent
evidence.22 Further, evidentiary rulings by a trial judge in a jury case
are reviewable, and error, if prejudicial, will be reversed.23  How then
can an appellate tribunal logically decide that the lower court is so
expert that it can without any need for review apply those very same
rules in nonjury cases? If in one there is need for review, the same
necessity must exist in the other. Apparently, therefore, the argument
that the expertness of the lower court judge vindicates the use of the
presumption is also open to attack.
A trial judge also instructs the jury as to the law applicable to the
facts, 24 and it would seem that the requirement that he write out his
legal conclusions in a nonjury case rejects the very reasoning upon
which the presumption has been based.25 It might be facetiously sug-
20. See note 6 supra.
21. "The offer at the trial ... is ordinarily made by the counsel's oral calling of a
witness or presentation of a document or by his oral statement of a question to a wit-
ness." 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 17 (3d ed. 1940). "The general principle governing the
time of the objection is that it must be made as soon as the applicability of it is knou
(or could reasonably have been known) to the opponent . " Id. § 18. "An objecting
opponent is ordinarily entitled to an immediate ruling. ... " Id. § 19.
22. ".... [Hie will base his findings upon the evidence which he regards as com-
petent, material and convincing .. .." Builder's Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Rev-
enue, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950). The ". . . presumption is that the trial court
based its findings and judgment solely upon competent evidence received and that it dis-
regarded all incompetent evidence." Grandin Grain & Seed Co. v. United States, 170
F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1948). See also Morris v. Williams, 149 F2d 703, 708 (8th Cir.
1945).
23. An example of court review may be found in Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 444 (1948). See also Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz. 201, 65 P.2d 1141 (1937);
Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 39 A.2d 546 (1944), and see State v. Ten-
nyson, 212 Minn. 158, 165, 2 N.W.2d 833, 837 (1942) ; Psaty & Fuhrman, Inc. v. Hous-
ing Authority, 76 R.I. 87, 96, 68 A.2d 32, 36 (1949) ; Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 473,
49 P.2d 649, 661 (1935).
24. See Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 528-529 (9th Cir. 1946); Lindley
v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 20, 30 N.E.2d 456, 462 (1940) ; Lewis v. Watson, 229 N.C. 20, 23,
47 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1948) ; Kindt v. Reading Co., 352 Pa. 419, 428-429, 43 A.2d 145, 150
(1945). King v. Consolidated Products Co., 159 Kan. 608, 610, 157 P.2d 541, 542 (1945).
The judge may not, of course, instruct as to the weight to be given to evidence or com-
ment on the credibility of witnesses. His task is to instruct as to the law applicable in
the case.
25. See Block v. D. W. Nicholson Corp., 77 Cal. App.2d 739, -, 176 P.2d 739, 744
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gested that the trial judge say only, "you win defendant (or plaintiff)"
with the reviewing tribunal presuming that he found the facts and the
law in that party's favor. In this instance there could be no reversal
unless the facts appearing in the record and the applicable law could not
possibly substantiate his decision. But it is felt to be better practice to
apprise the upper court of the exact legal foundations of the decision.
It may be readily admitted that a jurist, because of greater ex-
perience in a courtroom and an awareness of the rules of evidence
and logic, is well qualified to decide what facts were proved at a trial,
but the argument which leads from this premise to the conclusion that
he will be unaffected by unreliable evidence is demonstrably faulty. And,
although it is conceded that he is skilled in finding facts and making
evidentiary rulings, it should not be inferred from this that he has
attained perfection and, therefore, that there is no need for review or
that better methods cannot be found to aid him in accomplishing this
task.20 Perhaps somewhere between the rigid application of the rules
of evidence that is found in jury trials and the present practice in
nonjury cases there lies a middle ground that will provide an equally
expeditious and yet more efficient administration of justice.
At the present time, as for the past fifty years, the rules of evi-
dence are under severe attack. More and more legal scholars are
raising their voices and pens to state objections to the strictness of
their application and to the lack of logic behind them.27  Successful
operation of administrative agencies, functioning in their quasi-judicial
capacities without adhering to these rules, has increased the agitation
for at least some alteration that will allow the courts to work more
efficiently.28 Indeed, the American Law Institute has condemned them,
(1947) ; Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Tite, 119 Ind. App. 251, 254, 85 N.E.2d 365,
366-367 (1949) ; Sacre v. Sacre, 143 Me. 80, 101, 55 A.2d 592, 603-604 (1947) ; Brawley
v. Anderson, 80 Ohio App. 15, 18, 74 N.E.2d 428, 429 (1947). FEm. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
26. "To ascertain the facts is not a mechanical act. It is difficult art, not a science.
It involves skill and judgment. As fact-finding is a human undertaking, it can, of course,
never be perfect and infallible. For that very reason every effort should be made to
render it as adequate as it humanly can be." United States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 943
(2d Cir. 1942).
27. "I think that it would be juster and more exact to say that our law of evidence
is a piece of illogical, but by no means irrational patchwork; not at all to be admired,
nor easily to be found intelligible, except as a product of the jury system . . . where
ordinary, untrained citizens are acting as judges of fact." THAYER, EvIni--cE 509 (1898).
Others have not been so kind in reference to their validity even in jury situations.
"Despite urgent assault by learned and insistent critics, many phases of the law of evi-
dence remain intolerably technical, artificial, illogical and outmoded." Rubin, Evidence,
1947 AxNuAL SuRvxx OF AmERcAN LAW 1068. "A great weakness has been exposed in
the law of evidence by Professors Wigmore, Davis, McCormick, Maguire, Morgan and
Epstein. Logic is their ally. Tradition is their enemy." Note, 46 ILL. L. REV. 915, 925
(1952). See note 10 supra.
28. See Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cir. 1945), cert.
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saying that "the law of evidence is now where the law of forms of
action and common law pleading was in the early part of the nineteenth
century.
29
Although differing suggestions have been offered in regard to
exactly what changes should be made by those most familiar with the
subject, there is agreement that rigidity in applying these rules must
be removed so that more relevant and material evidence can be ad-
mitted.A0 Evidence must be adjudged inadmissible, they insist, only
for logical reasons. Before it should be excluded some logical means
must be employed in order to determine that this evidence would be
prejudicial or have little value or that it is not the kind of evidence
by which prudent persons should be influenced in making decisions.
The fact that it may or may not fit into a rule of law laid down cen-
turies ago should not, they say, always be the sole deciding point.3 1
How much more discretion the trial judge will be given or which of
these proposals will be adopted is uncertain, but that his powers will
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945) ; DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 448 (1951). "But it is the
administrative process that is demonstrating through extensive experience the practical
success of receiving 'any oral or documentary evidence' and of giving it such probative
weight as the finder of facts thinks that it deserves in the particular record." Davis,
Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REV. 581,
607 (1950). Professor Davis argued that when administrative agencies are considering
public interest "irrationalities of those rules cannot be allowed to hamper the process of
getting needed information." Id. at 587.
29. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 5 (1942).
30. ". . . [T]he hard rules of exclusion will soften into standards of discretion to
exclude." McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 580 (1938).
"Moreover, if we are to have a better system of trial on the facts, through the adoption
of the Code of Evidence, we lawyers must not only be willing to concede wide powers
to the trial judge, but we must, as ministers of justice, assume greater responsibility for
co-operating with the judge in the exercise of those powers. . . . 'Judges must become
stronger and better equipped at the trial bench, and more liberal and more justice-
seeking on the appellate bench. The rules must be treated only as a means to an end.'
... " McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of The American Law Institute, 20 TEx.
L. REv. 661, 673-674 (1942). "The Code would make almost all materially relevant evi-
dence admissible and would give the trial judge a large measure of discretion in the
application of its provisions." Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L.
REV. 481 (1946) ; ". . . I shall refrain from expressing any personal ideas, other than
one concept, which is the outgrowth of my experience of 13 years at the bar and 29
years on the bench, and which I think, may properly be emphasized. It is that, subject
to the limitations imposed by well-settled basic rules of Evidence, a wide discretion
should be accorded the trial judge in determining the admissibility of proffered proof."
Phillips, A Symposium On Evidence, Forward, 5 VAND. L. REV. 275 (1952).
31. "The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest-if they are
to rest upon reason-is their adaption to the successful development of the truth. And
since experience is of all teachers the most dependable, and since experience also is a
continuous process, it follows that a rule of evidence at one time thought necessary to
the ascertainment of truth should yield to the experience of a succeeding generation
whenever that experience has clearly demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old
rule." Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
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have to be broadened in order to allow for a more flexible application
of any new rules of evidence seems clear.
In a jury trial an offer to introduce incompetent evidence is met by
an objection by opposing counsel upon which the judge must rule
setting out why he believes it should or should not be admitted.32 It
has been pointed out by an opponent of the new Model Code in this con-
nection that too much opportunity for discretion on the part of the
trial judge would make preparation of a. case extremely precarious
because of the uncertainty surrounding admissibility.3 3 This could lead
to efforts to introduce clearly incompetent evidence in the hope that
the more offered the greater the chance that some highly persuasive
testimony or exhibit would get to the jury. The Model Code also
permits the trial judge to instruct the jury as to the weight which
certain evidence may be given.34 But regardless of the outcome of the
debate as to the judge's discretion and power under a new code, the
presence o'f a jury means that the judge will be required to rule imme-
diately on whether an offer to prove will be accepted. An appellate
tribunal, therefore, will be in a position to examine these rulings and
subsequent instructions to the jury and ascertain the propriety of the
court's actions with reasonable certainty. 35
Although under the Model Code, it would still be possible to
review the trial court's determination of what was competent in a jury
trial, it would be impossible for an appellate court to do so in a non-
jury trial because no evidentiary rulings or instructions are required. 36
Since in an appeal from such a proceeding a court would be unable
to say with any degree of certainty what was competent, only supreme
32. 1 WIG.M!OaE, EVIDENcE §§ 17, 18, 19 (3d ed. 1940).
33. "How any experienced practitioner, at home in his state practice, expecting a
conflict of testimony, and probably somebody lying, could prepare properly for trial
under this Rule 106 is hard to understand." Wigmore, American Law Institute Code of
Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A.J. 23, 24 (1942). This statement in regard to
Rule 106 seems also to describe Professor Wigmore's opposition to the great discretion
given to the trial judge by other parts of the Code.
For the Code's answer to this criticism, see McElroy, Some Observations Concerning
The Discretions Reposed In Trial Judges By The American Law Institute's Code of
Evidence, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE 356, 367 (1942).
34. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE, Rule 8 (1942).
35. "We need not feel apprehensive as to the willingness of appellate courts to
consider seriously complaints of prejudicial abuse of discretion by the trial judges. .The
history of courts of review demonstrates a steadfast readiness-if there by any extreme,
it is an excessive readiness-laboriously to consider such complaints." McElroy, Some
Observations Concerning The Discretions Reposed In Trial Judges By The American
Law Institute's Code of Evidence, MODEL CODE OF EVlDENCE 356, 360 (1942).
"Appellate courts, too, will rely heavily on the comments and examples for guid-
ance." Id. at 369.
36. See note 5 supra.
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optimism could induce using a presumption that the trial court based
its findings only on such evidence. The higher tribunal could not in
those instances where admissibility and weight were allowed to depend
upon the discretion of the trial court say whether evidence was per-
mitted to come in because the judge regarded it as competent and
which, therefore, affected the findings or whether he listened to it
because he agrees with current appellate declarations to the effect that
it would take too much time to argue its admissibilityY
Under a code of evidence which allows flexibility of application
at the trial level an appellate court would be compelled to give some
definition of its own to "competent evidence" in order to intelligently
review the findings of fact even in a cursory manner. The discretion
granted the trial court by new rules, which purport to give increased
weight to its evaluation, would be of little value because the reviewing
judges could have no way to discover how the discretion was exercised.
These appellate definitions could well become binding precedents which
would bar further exercise of lower court discretion in similar situa-
tions. The framers of the Model Code of Evidence made manifest
that one of their objectives was to free the trial judge from as many
predetermined bonds on admissibility as possible and to allow him to
work freely within broadly defined limits.3 8 How to make use of rules
which have greater adaptability in their application and yet retain com-
petent review of lower court findings in nonjury trials presents a chal-
lenge that must be met. Some way must be found for the reviewing
court to discover what evidence proved the facts and what evidence was
merely laid aside by the judge as being of little or no value. If an
uncertain method, such as the one used today, is retained, the judicial
system will continue to sacrifice the ability of the trial judge to deter-
mine the credibility of witnesses.39 The adoption of a new code of
evidence contemplating more discretion at the trial level would not
only force the appellate court to decide as to the credibility of witnesses
for itself, but in addition would probably compel it to determine what
evidence the trial judge believed competent without any indication on
his part.
37. See note 19 supra.
38. "The keystone of our system of administering justice is the trial judge. ...
"The Code Of Evidence therefore proceeds upon the theory that it is to be admin-
istered by an honest and intelligent judge; and that the trier of facts, whether or not a
jury, has the capacity and desire to hear, consider and fairly evaluate all data which
reasonable men would use if confronted with the necessity of solving a problem of like
importance in their everyday life." MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 7, 10 (1942) (Foreword
by Professor Edmund M. Morgan). See note 30 supra.
39. See pp. 450-451 supra.
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The presumption that a trial judge considers only the competent
evidence when he has listened to all which has been proffered is not the
only available means of dealing with this problem; two alternatives
are at hand. The first of these is to require that a trial court sitting
as a trier of fact apply the same rules of evidence that are proper when
a jury is present.4 0  Theoretically, incompetent evidence which is ob-
jected to may not be used as the basis of a finding; consequently, no
legitimate advantage would be lost by such a rule.41 An assertion that
this would put the same restrictions on a trial judge as are put on a
jury42 appears to be unpersuasive since use of the incompetent evidence
is not permitted.43  Although some inadmissible but not prejudicial
evidence is entered, it could be withdrawn from consideration as in
a jury proceeding. 44  If the law of evidence is too restrictive or so
difficult to apply that time is consumed unprofitably, then sufficient
reasons have been set forth for improving the law and not for resorting
40. Some courts have always adhered to such a rule. See Kovacs v. Szentes, 130
Conn. 229, 33 A.2d 124 (1943) ; In re Estate of Zanette Conner, 240 Iowa 479, 492, 36
N.W.2d 833, 841 (1949); Walker v. Anderson, 160 Kan. 461, 464, 163 P.2d 359, 361
(1945) (holding that unless there is a motion to strike it will be presumed that the
evidence was considered); Newman v. Newman, 211 Mass. 508, 98 N.E. 507 (1912).
The Massachusetts courts believe that free admission is not to be commended, but they
no longer reverse on that ground. A recent case in that jurisdiction pointed out that:
"'In either case it is always desirable that the person who determines the facts,
whether he be judge or juror should hear only what the law says he may hear."'
Holcombe v. Hopkins, 314 Mass. 113, 118, 49 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1943), citing Newman v.
Newman, supra; see also Weibert v. Hanan, 202 N.Y. 328, 331, 95 N.E. 688, 689 (1911)
(which did leave it possible for the trial judge to indicate that the inadmissible evidence
carried no weight); Abramowitz v. Wisch, 159 N.Y.S. 738 (1916).
41. See note 22 supra.
42. ". . . [W]e, the judges, . . . are able to discern and segregate those matters
by which you, the jurors, might be led astray or biased, but when we come to take your
place and try the facts, we will put the same legal blinders on our own eyes, lest we
be led astray or biased, though we are at all times able to discern." 36 HAIv. L. REV.
193 (1922).
43. "In a non-jury case, the presumption is that the trial court based its findings
and judgment solely upon competent evidence received, and that it disregarded all in-
competent evidence." Grandin Grain & Seed Co. v. United States, 170 F.2d 425, 427
(8th Cir. 1948). A few courts, in allowing the trial court to admit all evidence with-
out ruling, have pointed out that they do not consider this to be a good practice. See
Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 232, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (1943) ; Holcombe v. Hopkins,
314 Mass. 113, 118, 49 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1943).
Some judges have adopted the practice of stating in their findings or opinions that
they relied only on the competent evidence. See Hatch v. Calkins, 21 Cal. App.2d 364,
-, 122 P.2d 126, 129 (1942); Re Stockham, 193 Iowa 823, 828, 186 N.W. 650, 652
(1922); State v. O'Malley, 115 La. 1095, 1106, 40 So. 470, 473 (1906); Cannon v.
Miller, 22 Wash2d 227, 238, 155 P.2d 500, 506 (1945). This may be considered somewhat
better than the majority practice if only for the reason that it might tend to compel the
trial judge to look more carefully at the record to make sure such evidence was present
in sufficient quantity to uphold his decision.
44. See note 1 supra. Of course in a nonjury trial such action would be in the
form of a statement at the close of the trial instead of an instruction.
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to a presumption which only adds uncertainty. The only advantage,
therefore, that the present practice can claim over this alternative is
the saving in time. A plan that would avoid the need for evidentiary
rulings and argument and yet elude the pitfalls of the present procedure
would obviously be preferable.
The other alternative would require the trial judge to state in
writing with his findings and rulings of law upon what evidence he
relied. This need not be unduly burdensome because a complete re-
statement of the record would not be necessary; instead, a brief report
of the evidence supporting the essential findings of the case would
suffice. The Model Code provides that the judge may comment on
the weight to be accorded certain evidence.45 In a nonjury trial a corre-
sponding declaration could be included in the same report. In a case
before a jury it would have to be presumed that they followed the
court's instructions in regard to the weight to be given particular
evidence,46 but in a nonjury case even this is not necessary. The judge
in a lucid statement would specify what affected his findings, and no
presumption need exist.
It is possible for a judge to believe honestly that so called incom-
petent evidence has had no influence when in fact it has.47 If, however,
he is obliged to go through the record with the express purpose of
considering the competence of the evidence there is a greater possibility
that he will be more careful to seek out evidence which sustains his
decision. Throughout the entire trial, in fact, a greater awareness of
the need for competent evidence will be induced. Certainly the most
efficient way to decide which evidence is really competent is to write
out the findings of fact and the evidence relied on to support them,
just as one of the best ways to test any impression is to try to express
it on paper.48
With this specific statement made available to an appellate court
there would be no reason to rely on a presumption of what the judge
did; it would be far more practicable to look at his statement in order
45. MoDEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 8 (1942).
46. Just as now they must be presumed to have obeyed instructions regarding
applicable law. See Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U.S. 552, 567 (1900) ; Husky Ref. Co.
v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Bessey v. Solemme, 302 Mass. 188, 210-211,
19 N.E.2d 75, 86 (1939) ; Stricker v. Scott, 283 Mass. 12, 14, 186 N.E. 45, 46 (1933);
Woodman v. Peck, 90 N.H. 292, 293, 7 A.2d 251, 253 (1939).
47. "A trial judge, every now and then, thus discovers that his initially contem-
plated decision will not jell, and is obliged to decide otherwise." Frank, Say It With
Music, 61 HARV. L. REv. 921, 950 (1948).
48. Occasionally in setting out what he initially thought to be his decision a trial
judge discovers he is wrong and must decide otherwise for ". . . 'to put an argument
in syllogistic form is to strip it bare for logical inspection.'" Id. at 951.
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to ascertain whether evidence sufficient to sustain the findings was in-
troduced. In this situation, Federal Rule 52(a), involving credibility
of witnesses, is given real meaning. Evidence which meets the require-
ments of the law, but which was brought in by persons whom the trial
judge believed unreliable, could not be utilized by an appellate court to
reverse his decision unless, of course, it knowingly chose to disregard
the accompanying evaluation. 49 If part of the present adherence to the
presumption has been caused by a desire on the part of jurists to be
allowed to hear some incompetent evidence in order to be more certain
of their findings, this plan permits that practice to continue while elimi-
nating some of its danger. In the event the judge's discertionary power
is increased by the adoption of a new code of evidence, a reviewing
court will be able to understand with reasonable certainty how that
discretion was exercised and to base the outcome of its review not upon
a presumption which may or may not be true, but upon the statement
made by the trial judge to explain his actions. 50
"The facts as 'found' are inherently guessy: but we need not be
content with the present guessing techniques of our trial courts."' Pro-
fessor Sunderland, while bringing forth cogent arguments in opposition
to requiring special findings of fact, does concede that they are useful in
the appellate court.52 He concludes from this that they should only be
made in answer to a motion for new trial or in preparation for an
appeal.5 3 Compelling findings of fact only in this limited situation mean§
that they would be prepared not while the trial was fresh in the jurist's
49. "The Supreme Court may . .. in actions tried without a jury ... reverse a
finding of facts ...where, although there is evidence to support the finding, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1947).
50. Although more certainty would be added to the law if the jury were to state
what testimony it relied upon, it would be impossible to compel them to prepare such a
statement. In any case, since a jury hears only competent evidence, it is permissible to
assume that the witnesses for the winning party were believed credible by them.
51. Frank, supra note 47, at 954.
52. "But the second suggestion, that findings facilitate the work of the reviewing
court in an ordinary appeal, by clarifying the issues, has substantial merit ....
"No findings were required in any case unless and until an appeal was taken ....
"Unfortunately the power of the common law tradition was too great to permit this
[referring to the preceding paragraph] admirable plan to become firmly estab-
lished. . . ." Sunderland, Findings of Fact and 'Conclusions of Law In Cases Where
Juries Are Waived, 4 U. oF Cmi. L. R.v. 218, 230-231 (1937).
53. "In effect it transfers the use of findings from the field of trial practice to
the field of appellate review. By so doing, it eliminates, in the trial court, all the
useless burdens resulting from the substitution of special findings for the common-law
special verdict, and it preserves, in the appellate court, whatever advantages result from
a judicial specification of the precise matters of law and fact which are challenged on
appeal." Id. at 232.
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mind, but later when he may no longer remember the witnesses' actions.54
Indeed, in the federal system he may move on to another division within
his district before receiving notice that a motion for new trial has been
made and that appeal will follow if it is not granted.55 This factor, and
the increased likelihood of better consideration of the evidence discussed
above, indicates that the statement of what evidence was relied upon
should be prepared in every case with the findings of fact.
A trial attorney might, because of this, be better prepared to decide
whether an appeal should be made, and the appellate court would be in
a position to give great weight to the trial judge's evaluation of the credi-
bility of witnesses. Provision must also be made to allow the judge to
amend this statement just as he may amend his findings of fact.56 Such
a plan must not be enacted in order to become a device that will spawn
reversals on technical grounds. It would perhaps be best to permit the
appellate court to request any clarification that it desires from the trial
court. 5 7 A reversal, therefore, should result only where the statement is
completely inadequate.
If the rules of evidence were strictly applied in a nonjury trial, the
time needed would be considerably increased. Since the court would have
to hear arguments on evidentiary rules, this plan fails to utilize the
capability of the trial judge to apply them when he makes findings of
fact. However, if the judge were required to state what he relied on, the
advantages claimed by the present practice would be retained and the
disadvantages avoided. Because appellate review was not intended to be
a complete reconsideration of the facts, does not mean that it should be
accomplished by mere conjecture. Such a requirement would put real
meaning into review of nonjury litigation.
No adequate reason has been advanced for continuing guesswork in
reviewing findings of fact; rather there should be thorough examination
of the exact actions of the lower court with a view toward handing down
accurate and well reasoned opinions which state precisely the grounds of
54. "He cannot now vividly recall the demeanor of those witnesses whose testimony
is relevant .... " Frank, supra note 47, at 947.
55. For an enumeration of districts and divisions of district courts, see 62 STAT.
874, 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (Supp. 1952).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b).
57. Two methods could be used to save the question of the court's reliance on
incompetent evidence for an appeal. An attorney would object at the time the evidence
is introduced with no argument permitted. This would apprise the judge of the fact
that he thinks the evidence is questionable.. The trial judge would then consider the
objection as he prepares his statement of what evidence he relied on and his findings of
fact. Later, counsel could in his motion for new trial raise the point again. The
objecting attorney's and the trial judge's beliefs would, therefore, be amply clear to
the appellate tribunal on appeal.
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affirmance or reversal. The requirement of a more complete statement
by the trial judge would help achieve this result.
ALIMONY IN INDIANA: TRADITIONAL
CONCEPTS v. BENEFIT TO SOCIETY
The family is a permanent institution around which our civilization
has formed throughout its development.1 Society has constantly been on
guard to see that the family is protected and that, if it is dissolved, its
goals are perpetuated and restoration encouraged. The law of alimony
necessarily plays a major role in this endeavor to save, if possible, the
community's stake in the family unit even after it has disintegrated.2
To accomplish this the rights and duties of ex-spouses should be assigned
with a clear conception of the impact they will have on the community's
interest in the family. Unfortunately, however, great confusion exists
in Indiana in the law of permanent alimony. While the courts have de-
clared the alimony policy of the State to be primarily a determination of
property rights between the parties, 3 close analysis of the cases reveals
that several contradictory theories are being applied under the guise of
property division. In an effort to establish a method of alimony payment,
the Legislature has attempted to remedy the inadequacies of previous law
with a new statute the language of which is so inconsistent that it de-
mands clarification by the courts or, perhaps, amendment.4
1. "It is not wholly improbable ... that the family in some form must be accepted
as the initial society, possibly among all the races of mankind." 1 HowARD, A HISTORY
OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 10 (1904). See also 1 WESThRMARcK, THE HISTORY OF
HUtmAw MARRIAgE (5th ed. 1925).
2. "The far ramifications of the law of persons and of property aim to safeguard
the institution of the family... ." Kelso, The Changing Social Setting of Alimony Law,
6 LA.w & CONTEMP. PROB. 186, 187 (1939).
3. ". . . [T]he institution of a divorce suit ... conferred upon the court in which
the divorce was pending complete jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the property
in controversy." Gray v. Miller, 122 Ind. App. 531, 539, 106 N.E.2d 709, 712 (1952). In
the same case the court, in considering the judicial function in the determination of
alimony, quoted from Muckenburg v. Holler, 29 Ind. 139, 141 (1867), that "'all ques-
tions of property between the parties, like that in controversy here, are thus in litigation
in a suit for divorce, and must there be settled.'" Ibid.
4. "The court shall fix the amount of alimony and shall enter a judgment for such
sum, and shall specify the method and character of payment, which in his discretion he
deems to be just and proper under all the evidence, including any valid separation agree-
ment which may have been introduced into evidence. In determining the character of
the payments of the alimony the court may require it to be paid in money, other prop-
erty, or both, and may order the transfer of property as between the parties, whether
real, personal or mixed and whether the title at the time of trial is held by the parties
jointly or by one of them individually. In determining the method of payment of the
